The U.S Needs a New Nuclear Policy

The need to sacrifice geopolitical capital to ensure a stable nuclear world is as crucial as ever, and yet increasingly unlikely.

For all of the Atomic Age, the nuclear powers have agreed on one thing: More countries cannot gain access to the bomb. Not only does proliferation risk annihilation, it also weakens the immense influence that those who have nuclear weapons hold over the world. The ability to destroy not just a city or territory but the world itself is a powerful indicator of geopolitical prestige, and one that the nuclear guard was not keen to give up. That is changing. In a world without global leadership or a singular great power, more nations are re-evaluating how to best ensure the survival of their nation and, in some cases, regime. The need for the U.S. to once again take the mantle of nuclear leadership in the world is critical both for national and international security. Time is running out to contain what could become the most dangerous moment of the nuclear age.

For decades the U.S. approached arms control as a mutually beneficial relationship where non-proliferation and reduction of arms were inherently attractive to both parties. This policy was both sensible and effective in a bipolar security environment where both the Soviet Union and the U.S. had equal investment in relative global stability. While this did not preclude the behemoth increase in missile production and storage during the first three decades of the Cold War, it did help prevent the worst-case scenario. Unfortunately, the security environment has shifted and demands a new, more forgiving arms control doctrine from the U.S. and West at large. An isolated Russia and volatile North Korea have little incentive to uphold the existing security structure that has allowed for U.S. hegemony since 1989. With this in mind, the U.S. must approach future arms control negotiations not only without preconditions but with initial incentives for communication.

Russia, which has rapidly become the leader of an Axis of Rogues in conjunction with Iran and North Korea, must be the center of this new nuclear policy. The first step to arms control with Russia must begin with the cessation of conflict in Ukraine. Russia simply has no incentive to meet or extend treaties like New START while it is in a near direct conflict with NATO. The use of veiled nuclear threats has been a successful tactic to prevent more direct Western involvement in Ukraine, further hindering the opportunity for real progress on this crucial issue. By pushing for a ceasefire in Ukraine, the U.S. can show that it is seriously committed to resuming arms control talks that benefit Americans far more than any imagined Ukranian victory.

The careful balance of isolating and enforcing penalties on Russia while also not removing Russian incentive for a secure global order is not an easy proposition; however, it is one that must be decisively followed. Russia has already shared nuclear technology with North Korea, enabling the regime to rapidly expand upon its nuclear ambitions. The U.S. should push for a ceasefire in Ukraine in exchange for an extension of New START in combination with the halting of nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran. Russia’s Axis of Rogues is a formidable threat to security worldwide, but not an alliance bound by anything more than mutual benefit. Breaking apart this alliance and returning North Korea and Iran to their pariah status is critical to preventing nuclear proliferation. The U.S. cannot simply ignore Russia as a nuclear state or assume that Putin is equally concerned with proliferation when the landscape has so radically changed since even a decade ago. Facing the issue head-on will require a level of diplomatic sensitivity and political capital that will no doubt turn heads, but communication with Russia is simply unavoidable.

It’s an indictment of our current security environment that an emboldened and isolated Russia is simply one of many nuclear crises facing our world. As the war in the Middle East has expanded from Gaza to Lebanon and now to Tehran, concerns have grown that Supreme Leader Khamenei and his regime will pivot towards the construction of a bomb. While these concerns may be overblown, at least at the moment, the question of how to prevent a nuclear Iran remains critical to ensuring a stable Middle East. The U.S. has a responsibility to prevent Tehran from constructing a nuclear bomb by any means necessary. First and foremost, the priority should be a reintroduction of the Iran Nuclear Deal and in exchange a resumption of sanctions relief. Avoiding a conflict with Iran is paramount, as our efforts to detect and stop the assembly of a bomb are not guaranteed. The infrastructural investment that a prolonged nuclear whack-a-mole with Iran would require could incapacitate an already overworked military's ability to respond to developing threats in other regions.

Iran assembling a nuclear device would ignite proliferation across the region, as each state rushes to secure their own strategic deterrent. Saudi Arabia has already stated that if Iran were to pass the nuclear threshold, they would begin assembling their own. There is no way to truly highlight how dangerous this would be, not only because of the region's propensity for war but also for the potential of a terrorist organization to gain access to an atomic device. The U.S. would either have to accept that an entire region of countries with a history of conflict now have the weapons to end humanity, or begin a continual process of conflict with states looking to achieve access to the bomb. Neither of these options is palatable and both risk the use of a nuclear crisis the likes of which this world has not seen in decades. Working with Iran to resolve this issue before it assembles the bomb is both critical to proactively preventing conflict and unlikely to happen in this current security environment.

Even allied countries like South Korea, Japan, Germany, and Poland should not be given access to nuclear technology. While the U.S. may hold positive and productive relationships with all of these countries, that future is far from guaranteed. It cannot be highlighted enough how the proliferation of the bomb does not reduce the need for U.S. support or lower the risk of conflict across the world. The fact of the matter is that the time to procure a bomb and achieve an adequate deterrent in the Korean Peninsula or in Europe is behind us. It is unimaginable to not expect a strenuous push from nations like North Korea and Russia if South Korea or Poland began their own nuclear program. The nuclear umbrella is the strongest form of U.S. leverage and influence, allowing us to lead alliances with a minimal strategic investment. There is simply no reason to abdicate responsibility of our nuclear arsenal to our allies, no matter how trusted they may be.

The U.S. must adopt a no-holds-barred policy regarding proliferation across the region. We must show the Global South that the U.S. believes that nuclear weapons are such a fundamental threat that they transcend alliances and organizations. The U.S. cannot become the world’s nuclear police all on our own, and the Global South will hold the keys to economic and political pressure for less friendly states. In addition to the clear benefits of reducing the risk of a species-wide self-destruction, the U.S. will gain the chance to rebuild credibility as a leader to an increasingly jaded group of countries looking East for economic and social growth. Rallying these countries under one banner will pressure China, and in turn Russia and its axis, to come to the negotiating table and produce substantive arms control.

There is good reason to argue that the current security environment demands a restrained United States, unwilling and unable to help our allies across the world while protecting the security of the homeland. I have argued for restraint in Ukraine and in the Middle East and believe strongly that the U.S. should speak softly and carry a big stick. However, the threat of an expanded nuclear world is one that only the United States can work to prevent. We cannot put our heads in the geopolitical sand and ignore such a grave threat to the world and to the international order. If the U.S. is willing to bankroll a stalled defeat in Ukraine and sacrifice political capital in Israel, then we can surely find the bravery to prevent this world from descending further into anarchy. There is no avoidance on this issue, and our inaction cannot be tolerated any longer. It’s time to ask ourselves, as Americans and as humans, if we are willing to once again take the lead on the most important issue in the world.